Is sugar an explosion hazard ? (PDF) - May'08

Yes, if it is a fine powder or dust! Any material which can burn is capable of causing a catastrophic dust explosion if it is suspended as a fine dust or powder in air or other oxidizing atmosphere. On February 7, 2008 there was a severe explosion in a sugar refinery near Savannah, Georgia, USA. The explosion injured more than 30 people, and the death toll had reached 13 as of the end of March 2008. The explosion is still being investigated, and the detailed causes are not yet known. However, the initial investigation indicates that this was a dust explosion.

 

CCPS Process Safety Beacon Information (PDF) - May'08

The CCPS Process Safety Beacon is read by over half a million process safety and plant personnel in chemical, petrochemical, pharmaceutical, consulting, insurance companies, government agencies, and other organizations in the US and worldwide.  The Beacon's target audience is front line manufacturing personnel, so the topics must relate to process safety.

 

Accident Epidemiology and the RMP Rule: Learning from a Decade of Accident History Data for the U.S. Chemical Industry (PDF) - April'08

This report describes analysis undertaken by an interdisciplinary team of researchers on accident history data collected under Clean Air Act, Section 112(r), enacted as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Section 112(r) is also referred to as the Risk Management Program or RMP Rule, because this law and its implementing regulations impose requirements on facilities that manufacture or handle certain chemicals that encompass the development of a Risk Management Program and Plan for the facility.

 

Linking OII and RMP*Info Data: Does Everyday Safety Prevent Catastrophic Loss? (PDF) - April'08

We link the Risk Management Program (RMP) database of accident histories collected by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for the period 1996-2000 under section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act Amendments and OSHA reported Occupational Illnesses and Injuries (OII) for the same period. We explore various statistical associations between OIIs and RMP-reported accidents. If we think of OIIs as reflecting everyday safety performance and RMP accidents as reflecting major accidents, then the analysis can be considered a test of whether good everyday safety performance is a foundation for preventing or mitigating relatively rare major accidents. We find only weak evidence that this is the case for the U.S. chemical facilities reporting in the RMP database. The paper concludes with some implications of these findings for industrial risk management and research.

 

Predicting and Confirming the Effectiveness of Systems for Managing Low-Probability Chemical Process Risks (PDF) - April'08

This article addresses the role of a facility’s process safety management system (PSMS) in preventing low probability– high consequence (LP–HC) accidents. We review the rationale for the hypothesis that a facility’s PSMS is the central driver of accident prevention, and we discuss how this rationale has been incorporated implicitly into the OSHA Process Safety Management standard (PSM) in 1992 and explicitly into both the EU Seveso II Directive and the USA EPA Risk Management Program regulation (RMP) in 1996. We then note that the limited process accident incidence data available to date have not resolved the issue of determining or predicting characteristics of a facility’s PSMS that are likely to be effective in reducing LP–HC accidents. Based on a variety of considerations, the authors propose retrospective and prospective case-control studies

on facilities with and without RMP reported process accidents using candidate survey instruments to test which survey factors appear to have the greatest predictive power for the likelihood of future LP–HC accidents.

 

The adequacy of refuges, escape stairs and management procedures (PDF) - April'08

Three years after the explosion that killed 15 workers and injured 180 others at the BP Texas City refinery, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) today released a new, comprehensive safety video that describes the causes of the accident and key safety lessons.

 

Three Years after Explosion at Refinery, CSB Releases New Safety Video on Accident - Mar'08

Three years after the explosion that killed 15 workers and injured 180 others at the BP Texas City refinery, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) today released a new, comprehensive safety video that describes the causes of the accident and key safety lessons.

 

Pressure vessel failure during Hydrotest - Jan'08

Photos of a pressure vessel that recently failed whilst under hydrotest during post fabrication testing. This vessel was manufactured by a vessel vendor in China and the plate was of Chinese mill origin. Unfortunately this is another example of serious equipment/material failures with equipment being sourced out of the rapidly developing economies such as China, Eastern Bloc and others. These examples are becoming almost a weekly occurrence now and are exhibiting failure modes not seen in the mature manufacturing economies since the 1930's. Again we need to ensure vigilance in the acceptance of manufacturers and once more I stress the need to know where the base materials are sourced from.

 

Oil Tank Fire Caused by Static Discharge & Storage Tank Explosion and Fire in Glenpool, Oklahoma - Dec''07

An 80,000 barrel (3.6 million gallon, 12,700 cu. M.) floating roof storage tank exploded and burned while being filled with diesel oil at a petroleum product storage terminal. The tank contained approximately 7000 barrels (300,000 gallons, 1,100 cu. M) of diesel oil at the time of the incident, and had previously contained gasoline. The fire burned for 21 hours and damaged two nearby storage tanks. There were no injuries or fatalities, but the total loss was over two million US dollars, nearby residents were evacuated, and schools in the area were closed for two days.

 

UK HSE Key Programme 3 - Asset Integrity Study - Nov'07

A three year investigation and the inspection of nearly 100 offshore installations has resulted in the offshore industry receiving a stark warning from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). The sector was told that while significant improvements had been made "more must be done!"

 

Excavation : Trench Safety Management - Nov'07

Glenpool Tank Fire Expect the Unexpected - Nov'07

“I have never been to a fire that didn’t present surprises or complexities at some point during the event.” This statement from Dwight Williams – President of Williams Fire & Hazard Control is the heart and soul of the real challenge before Industrial Firefighters.

 

PPG - Controlled Burn Guidance - Sept'07

Hydrogen Safety for First Responders - Aug'07

DOE's Introduction to Hydrogen Safety for First Responders is a Web-based course that provides an "awareness level" overview of hydrogen for fire, law enforcement, and emergency medical personnel. This multimedia tutorial acquaints first responders with hydrogen, its basic properties, and how it compares to other familiar fuels; hydrogen use in fuel cells for transportation and stationary power; potential hazards; initial protective actions should a responder witness an incident; and supplemental resources including videos, supporting documents, and links relevant to hydrogen safety.

Abridged versions of the training course will soon be available in print and on CD via DOE's Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Information Center at 877-EERE-INFO/877-337-3463.

http://www.hydrogen.energy.gov/firstresponders.html

 

Explosion Mechanism Advisory Group report  - Aug'07

The Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB) has been overseeing a comprehensive investigation of the incident and has published a number of reports on its findings. One important aspect of the incident was that a severe explosion took place, which would not have been anticipated in any major hazard assessment of the oil storage depot before the incident.

The Board invited a team of explosion experts from academia and industry to form a working group to advise on the work that would be required to explain the severity of the Buncefield explosion.